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Net Costs of Wildlife Damage 
on Private Lands 
Kimberly Rollins, Lori Heigh, and  Vinay Kanetkar 
This study models net welfare impacts on producers who receive utility from on-farm 
wildlife populations that are not costlessly disposable. Wildlife damage levels where 
net benefits are zero indicate producers' maximum willingness to pay for on-farm 
wildlife. An empirical model is developed. Results for Ontario producers suggest the 
net welfare loss from damage is approximately half of the value of the yield loss for 
those with damage. In aggregate, however, on-farm wildlife generates net benefits 
to producers that outweigh costs by about 10-to-1.  The distribution of net benefits is 
highly skewed across producers. 
Key words: random effects probit, tolerance thresholds, wildlife benefits, wildlife 
damage 
Introduction 
In response to problems caused by wildlife damage on private lands, various jurisdictions 
have implemented policies that include compensation, crop insurance, cost sharing for 
abatement and prevention  expenditures, wildlife management regimes that target 
problem areas and species, and contracting for control services. Policies vary with 
institutional  structure,  type of loss, wildlife population status, and other circumstances. 
Much of the economics literature regarding wildlife damage to agriculture focuses on 
problems posed by specific policy instruments, including implications for property rights 
arrangements,  market mechanisms, moral hazard, and maintaining damage prevention 
incentives (Schwabe and Schuhmann, 2002; Rondeau and Conrad, 2002; Yoder, 2000; 
Van Tassell, Phillips, and Yang, 1999;  Wagner, Schmidt, and Conover, 1997; Gray and 
Sulewski, 1997; Rollins and Briggs, 1996; Gray and Rollins, 1996; U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 1993). 
Successful formulation and implementation of most of these policies requires that 
aggregate and individual damage costs are quantifiable. Several authors focus on 
problems in measuring costs ofwildlife damage (Yoder, 2002; McNew and Curtis, 1997; 
Conover, 1994;  Wywialowski, 1994;  Conover and Decker, 1991;  Decker and Brown, 1982; 
Connelly, Decker, and Wear, 1987).  These studies tend to emphasize methods for esti- 
mating agricultural yield losses, and subsequently calculate costs by multiplying yield 
losses by commodity  market prices. Yoder (2002),  for example, addresses problems asso- 
ciated with estimating yield losses with censored data from wildlife damage claims. 
In the context of many wildlife damage policies, however, it is desirable to measure 
the cost of an on-farm wildlife population as  the welfare change to the landowner. The 
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market value of yield loss may be an incomplete measure of welfare change for many 
landowners. For a landowner who receives utility from an on-farm wildlife population, 
the utility loss would need to be greater than utility received in order for an on-farm 
wildlife presence to result in a net loss.' Wildlife can be thought of as an environmental 
good that exhibits costly disposal. Reducing an  on-farm wildlife presence is not costless. 
On-farm populations can be too large to produce net marginal utility gains, and net 
marginal utility can become negative. On the other hand, managing populations so as 
to minimize the financial cost of damage may cause a net welfare loss at  the margin, if 
on-farm wildlife benefits are not taken into account. The net welfare change for land- 
owners from on-farm wildlife populations would therefore need to take into account 
utility impacts that are not fully captured by the market value of yield 10sses.~ 
A marginal increase in an on-farm wildlife population permits a quality or quantity 
increase in on-farm wildlife-dependent activities, such as wildlife viewing or hunting. 
All else equal, a landowner who receives utility would be willing to forego some income 
to achieve benefits associated with a greater on-farm wildlife presence. As populations 
increase,  however, marginal damage costs may increase. A number of studies document 
landowners who indicate they will tolerate some damage as an  unavoidable cost of on- 
farm wildlife because they enjoy its presence on their land for recreation and aesthetic 
reasons; or they value their role as stewards of land and habitat (Schusler, Chase, and 
Decker, 2000; Gigliotti, Decker, and Carpenter, 2000; Pomerantz, Ng, and Decker, 1986; 
Siemer and Decker, 1991; Craven et al., 1992; Decker and Gavin, 1985; Enck, Purdy, 
and Decker, 1988;  Purdy and Decker, 1985).  At least one study concludes that for many 
landowners the presence of  on-farm wildlife is not the problem; the problem is the 
quantity of wildlife [Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement Association (OSCIA), 20001. 
These studies suggest there is an  optimal nonzero on-farm wildlife population for land- 
owners who value wildlife, beyond which the net marginal impact on utility becomes 
negative. The wildlife management literature defines this point as a "tolerance thresh- 
old" (Craven et al., 1992; Pomerantz, Ng, and Decker, 1986; Purdy and Decker, 1985; 
Siemer and Decker, 1991). For example, Connelly, Decker, and Wear (1987) define a 
tolerance threshold as the maximum amount of  damage people are willing to tolerate 
in return for the benefits of having wildlife (in this case deer) in their neighborhood. 
Results from this literature  indicate that producer tolerance thresholds vary with land- 
owner characteristics, attitudes toward wildlife, farm characteristics, wildlife species, 
regional wildlife population levels, and commodity (Decker and Brown, 1982;  Craven et 
al., 1992). Many of these studies are motivated by the need for criteria to set wildlife 
population goals and to predict circumstances for which damage may result in undesir- 
able conflicts between farmers and wildlife managers (Carpenter, Decker, and Lipscomb, 
2000; Decker and Gavin, 1985; Gigliotti, Decker, and Carpenter, 2000). In the case of 
valuable wildlife species, identifying policy options that increase tolerance thresholds 
for some landowners can rationalize management goals to increase regional populations 
(Schusler, Chase, and Decker, 2000). 
Similarly, people who may not like particular species of wildlife on their land for reasons other than mop and property 
damage could experience a welfare loss without a loss in a market-valued commodity. 
'In addition,  wildlife damage has been suffered by the agricultural sector historically,  muchlike variability  in productivity 
due to the quality of land and weather conditions. It can be argued that markets have incorporated crop yield losses and 
reflected them in the prices. If this were the case, then fanners would be at least partially compensated for their losses from 
wildlife damage to crops. Multiplying yield losses by market price would then overestimate farmers' actual welfare losses. 
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The tolerance threshold is easily interpreted as  the point where marginal utility from 
additional on-farm wildlife is no greater than the marginal disposal (damage) cost. The 
tolerance threshold is  therefore a landowner's maximum willingness to tolerate damage, 
which in turn indicates her or his maximum willingness to pay for the benefits associ- 
ated with on-farm wildlife. Compensating surplus is the amount of  income loss that 
would keep a landowner at a constant level of  utility while obtaining the welfare- 
enhancing higher quality or quantity of wildlife benefits, assuming the original wildlife 
population is low enough such that  marginal increases generate a net increase in utility. 
If the on-farm wildlife population is so large that marginal damage costs more than 
offset utility from wildlife benefits, then the landowner experiences a net utility loss. 
Here, the compensating surplus  is the  minimum amount the  landowner would be willing 
to accept to bear the increase in on-farm wildlife above the optimum. 
This analysis builds on contributions from the wildlife damage literature  on measuring 
observable maximum willingness to tolerate damage levels for agricultural producers. 
It  is hypothesized that an  individual landowner's willingness to tolerate wildlife damage 
is a function of net utility which accrues from wildlife, and that this hypothesis can be 
tested in a random utility framework. The random utility framework provides the  basis 
for estimating net welfare change associated with wildlife damage. The next section 
presents an economic model that explicitly incorporates tolerance for wildlife damage 
into a welfare measure for wildlife damage net of benefits. The model is then applied to 
data for field crop producers in Ontario, Canada. 
The Model 
Suppose a farmer's utility depends on the on-farm wildlife population, W,  and all other 
goods that can be purchased with farm income. The on-farm wildlife population is  exog- 
enous from the farmer's perspective, and affects utility in two ways. Marginal changes 
in  on-farm wildlife affect the quality and quantity  of activities that generate  utility, such 
as  wildlife viewing or recreational hunting, while crop damage and abatement expendi- 
tures decrease income. This is indicated by the indirect utility function, where P is a 
vector of prices for all other goods: 
Income when the on-farm wildlife population is zero is represented by 1°, and D(W) is 
income loss from wildlife damage. B(W) represents the level of  activities landowners 
enjoy which depend on on-farm wildlife. Wildlife damage and benefits are  also functions 
of other variables: 
(2)  D = D(W, L, G), 
(3)  B = B(W, L, F, H, E), 
where L is proximity to protected areas,  G is crop acreage, F  describes farmers' attitudes 
toward wildlife and H attitudes toward hunting, and E represents farm attributes. 
Equations (2) and (3)  describe supply and demand for wildlife on private land.3 
Public benefits accruing to off-farm residents are not accounted for in this model. For many wildlife species and locations, 
on-farm  forage and habitat support  wildlife populations at greaternumbers  than could be achieved without the contribution 
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We assume wildlife does not increase farm income; therefore, aDlaW  0. It follows 
from equations (1)-(3) that the net effect of  a marginal change in the on-farm wildlife 
population on utility is represented by: 
where the  first term on the  right-hand side, the  marginal utility ofwildlife-related activ- 
ities, is nonnegative, while the second term, the marginal utility of damage, is strictly 
negative. Therefore, the sign depends on the relative magnitudes of  marginal wildlife 
damages and benefits. 
If the  farmer receives no benefit from on-farm wildlife, then the first term on the right- 
hand side of equation (4) is zero. In this case, as the wildlife population in panel A of 
figure 1  increases from 0 to W1, crop damage increases from 0 to D(W1) and income 
decreases from I0  to I1.  The decrease in income reduces utility from V0 to V1. However, 
if the farmer receives some utility from on-farm wildlife, the net effect on utility from 
a change in W depends on the marginal wildlife benefits. 
Panel B of  figure 1  indicates how  marginal damage costs (right-hand axis) and 
marginal wildlife benefits (left-hand  axis)  change with on-farm  wildlife population levels 
(horizontal axis). If wildlife benefits are increasing at a decreasing rate, then W is the 
point where marginal wildlife benefits and  marginal wildlife damages are  equal. The net 
effect  -  is shown in panel C,  where utility is  greatest at V with on-farm wildlife population 
W.  Where W  <  W, net marginal value of on-farm wildlife is positive, aVlaW > 0. At w, 
the net marginal value of on-farm wildlife is zero, aVlaW = 0. And where the marginal 
value of  damage is greater than the marginal benefit of  on-farm wildlife, aVlaW < 0. 
Therefore, a farmer who derives benefits from on-farm wildlife maximizes utility at  W. 
This implies that damage costs, D(W),  may be nonzero when utility is maximized. In 
cases where individual farmers derive zero utility from wildlife, however, any level of 
damage causes a decrease in utility since there are no offsetting benefits. Hence, these 
farmers would have a zero tolerance for damage, i.e., D(W) = 0. 
D(W) represents the  maximum damage a landowner would be willing to tolerate from 
on-farm wildlifeor alternatively,  the  landowner's maximum willingness to pay for the 
associated on-farm wildlife benefits. In the context of the wildlife management litera- 
ture, D(W) is the damage tolerance threshold. When the value of yield losses is small 
compared to total income, the change in marginal utility of income induced by wildlife 
damage is negligible, and Wmay be strongly influenced by on-farm wildlife benefits. 
Panel D of figure 1  illustrates  the situation where damage D(W1) >  D(W). V is utility 
associated with W,  V1is utility associated with W1, and net income is I0  - D(W1). The 
difference between D(W1) and D(W) is the  money, M, that would need to be given to the 
landowner in order to leave him or her as well off as at  utility V: 
requiring  private lands inputs. The contribution to public good benefits  from private lands may be substantial, but is  beyond 
the scope of this study. The main implication  for interpreting  the tolerance thresholds and subsequent net welfare measures 
estimated in this study is that the measures are solely in terms of landowners' net welfare. If marginal increases in public 
good benefits are greater than the net marginal loss to farmers, then wildlife management policies may incorporate means 
to increase tolerance  thresholds, or otherwise compensate for damage above these thresholds using transfers from those who 
experience net gains. Rollins, Heigh, and Kanetkar 
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In this case, M is the landowner's minimum willingness to accept compensation for an 
on-farm wildlife population greater than W, or compensating surplus. Depending on 
whether the on-farm wildlife population is greater or less than W, a marginal change in 
on-farm wildlife may result in a net gain or net loss in welfare. Thus, for an on-farm 
wildlife population less than W, M would be the willingness to pay to achieve a greater 
level of wildlife benefik4 
The tolerance threshold D(W) can be directly estimated and then netted from reported 
damage costs to calculate the net welfare change M. To do so, we consider D(W) in the 
context of a random utility model. The farmer's indirect utility function can be written: 
where V(.) is the portion of utility attributable to observed factors, and  e is an  error term 
that  represents the unobservable portion of utility. I0  - D(W1)  is income net of damage. 
A landowner would be willing to tolerate a given level of damage D(W1)  if it  is less than 
or equal to D(W): 
where V1 is utility with an  on-farm wildlife population of  W1, and Vis utility with on- 
farm wildlife population of W. The probability that a farmer would be willing to tolerate 
wildlife damage W1 is expressed as: 
Rewriting equation (3,  we obtain: 
An  average individual tolerance threshold can be estimated in a random utility 
framework using a sample of farmers who experience a range of damages. The necessary 
data for each observation include income 1°,  damage D(W1), and a "yes" or "no" response 
as to whether the farmer is willing to tolerate that level of damage. The model could 
include additional variables which are hypothesized to affect the probability of a "yes" 
response. 
The  Data 
A 1999 survey provides data on wildlife damage to field crops in Ontario for the 1998 
growing season. Participants were selected at  random from a list of  Ontario producers 
representative of  the Ontario farm population. An overall 62%  response rate to the 
mailed survey resulted in a sample of 241 field crop producers. Data include yield losses 
by crop from wildlife damage, species causing damages, landowner characteristics, and 
farm characteristics. There were no options available for these producers to receive any 
type of  damage compensation, insurance, or cost recovery for abatement effort. 
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Rollins, Heigh, and Kanetkar  Net Cost of Wildlife Damage on Private Lands  523 
Ordered Observations 
Figure 2. Distribution of yield losses for Ontario field crop 
producers reporting wildlife damage 
A total of  108 respondents, about 45%,  reported wildlife damage to field crops during 
1998. For farms with damage, the mean value of loss by crop ranged from $221 for wheat 
to $1,385 for corn. The distribution of  the yield losses is highly skewed, as illustrated in 
figure 2, suggesting damages do not occur evenly across farms. The data reveal that a 
small number of farmers incur a significant amount of  loss, while the majority sus- 
tains very little. These results are consistent with other wildlife damage studies (e.g., 
Wywialowski, 1994). 
As indicated from focus group results, individuals from the survey population con- 
sidered losses to wildlife to be tolerable if these losses fell within a range they felt was 
reasonable to expect as part of  their normal operations. The notion of  "reasonable" in 
this case is a farmer's subjective assessment that appears strongly affected by  past 
experience, and personally held opinions on what constitutes a healthy wildlife popu- 
lati~n.~  Participants did not see damage losses as a widespread problem, except for 
extreme cases which occasionally can occur to a small number of landowners.  Moreover, 
survey respondents believed that agricultural producers are good stewards of  the land 
and wildlife habitat, and are willing to provide for reasonable levels of  wildlife and crop 
production. The majority reported undertaking projects on their lands for enhancing 
wildlife habitat. 
We  essentially assume that landowners'notions of "reasonable"  damage levels correspond to levels ofwhat they believe 
are "reasonablen  wildlife populations,  consistentwith other focus group results. This notion of a reasonable wildlife population 
is subjective from the farmer's perspective. Here, it  is assumed to derive from the utility farmers receive fromwildlife, which 
includes utility gained from direct use ofwildlife,  from the knowledge they are contributing to a healthy natural environment 
by providing habitat, from the public's perception of them as good stewards of the natural environment, or even as a type of 
bequest value where utility derives from an altruistic motive of providing habitat for wildlife for its own sake. 524  December 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Proportion of Producers Taking Past Preventative Action, and 
Average Annual Investment (N  = 241) 
Average Annual Investment for Farms 
Percent of Total Producers  Taking Preventative Action in 1998-1999 
Taking Preventative Action During  Material  Number of 
Wildlife Species  Last Five Years  Investment  Hours 
Geese  16%  $115  20 
Blackbirds  11%  $142  12 
Deer  12%  $175  24 
Raccoons  40%  $167  25 
Table 2. Percentages of Producers Who Took Preventative Action in the Last 
Five Years and Also Received Damage in 1998, by Wildlife Species 
Geese  Deer  Raccoons  Blackbirds 
No  No  No  No 
Action  Damage  Damage  Damage  Damage  Damage  Damage  Damage  Damage 
Prevention  4.1  3.9  12.8  1.0  28.4  3.0  2.8  1.4 
No Prevention  7.7  84.3  25.2  60.9  15.5  53.0  9.0  86.7 
Focus group participants pointed out they were not "anti-wildlife," and, as land 
stewards, they stated they were willing to absorb losses associated with maintaining 
healthy wildlife populations. A common sentiment among participants was that where 
problems did exist,  wildlife populations were "too large," and wildlife management 
agencies were not adequately responding to these "problem" wildlife populations. When 
losses tended to  consistently exceed "reasonable" levels, many producers felt "something 
should be done" by wildlife management agencies to reduce local wildlife populations 
(OSCIA, 2000). 
Respondents were queried about crop yields, damage, species causing damage, damage 
prevention effort, perceptions of on-farm wildlife population changes, and farm charac- 
teristics. Respondents were asked to rate the losses they experienced during the 1998 
growing season, by each crop type and wildlife species, as "tolerable" or "not tolerable." 
An example of this survey question format appears in the appendix6 
Respondents were asked whether they had undertaken any measures to prevent 
wildlife damage at any time during the five years previous to the 1998 growing season, 
by crop type and species of wildlife. This variable indicates past preventative activities, 
even if producers had not undertaken preventative actions during 1998.  Table 1  reports 
the percentage of producers who indicated they had undertaken preventative actions 
within the past five years, the average annual dollars spent, and the number of hours 
invested in these damage prevention activities. 
Table 2 shows the  relationship between producers who tookpast preventative actions 
and those who reported losses in 1998. The majority of producers who undertook past 
Since there was no history in Ontario of wildlife damage compensation or insurance programs, we assume a farmer's 
willingness to tolerate a given level of damage does not include an  implicit adjustment for any administrative costs or efforts 
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prevention also reported sustaining  damage in 1998. Meanwhile, the majority offarmers 
who did not report past preventative actions did not indicate sustaining  damage in 1998. 
For example, 90% of those who took preventative action against raccoon damage in the 
prior five years reported damage from raccoons in 1998,  while 30%  of those who did not 
previously undertake raccoon damage prevention had damage in 1998.  A similar trend 
is seen with geese, deer, and blackbirds. 
This finding suggests that some damage sustained in 1998 was predictable by 
producers, and perhaps systematically related to location and features which enhance 
local wildlife populations. Some landowners who undertook prevention may have done 
so because they had already experienced damage and expected to experience more. This 
is consistent with farmers' perceptions that where damage does occur, local wildlife 
populations are  "too large." Moreover, since these farmers had already experienced costs 
from past damageboth  in the  form of direct crop loss and indirectly in the form of costs 
of prevention activities-it  is likely their tolerance thresholds for damage in 1998  would 
be lower than for producers who did not report past prevention effort. 
We hypothesize that landowners who had invested in prevention activities over the 
previous five years would be less likely to tolerate a given level of  damage than those 
who have not. The cumulative sum of costs of past damage and prevention actions may 
erode a landowner's willingness to tolerate further damage. If some of the benefits of 
on-farm wildlife have already been offset, the  tolerance threshold would likely be lower. 
Thus a dummy variable indicating past prevention activity would be expected to reveal 
this lower threshold. 
Proximity of farmland to protected habitat is expected to influence a producer's 
tolerance threshold. A landowner who perceives that a nearby publicly owned protected 
area contributes to crop damage or reduces the effectiveness of on-farm prevention 
activities may have lower tolerance thresholds. Respondents are asked to indicate their 
proximity to publicly owned and privately owned natural areas. Distinguishing between 
ownership permits testing for the notion that landowners perceive private owners have 
greater discretion over land use, while public lands managers may not adequately 
account for wildlife impacts on nearby private lands. 
The percentage of household income from farming  potentially could affect willingness 
to tolerate wildlife damage. One hypothesis is that households who more heavily rely on 
farm income are  also those for whom farming is a way of life which embraces appreciation 
for the  relation between farm activities and stewardship  of land resources. Thus one might 
expect tolerance to be  increasing in the percentage of  total household income from 
agriculture. A second variable, the  percentage of total farm income from field crops alone, 
accounts for the relative importance of field crops in overall farm income. Landowners for 
whom field crops are a minor proportion of their overall  farm income may be more tolerant 
of a given level of damage, relative to those for whom field crops represent a large propor- 
tion of farm income. Further, tolerance is postulated to be decreasing in acreage devoted 
to a given crop, since the damage as a proportion of farm income would be increasing. 
Landowners were asked whether they believed local wildlife populations were 
increasing over the  previous five years. Focus group results indicate a widespread belief 
among participants that increasing populations of problem wildlife is a direct result of 
wildlife management's failure to address their problems. If farmer dissatisfaction with 
wildlife management is correlated with increasing local populations, then damage  toler- 
ance could be expected to decrease with increasing local wildlife populations. 526  December 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Other variables capture attitudinal differences among landowners that would be 
expected to affect tolerance thresholds. Respondents were asked a series of questions 
about the importance of on-farm wildlife for recreational hunting, insect control, and 
nonuse values. Landowners who indicate that nonuse values and insect control values 
are important to them would be expected to have higher tolerance thresholds. Similarly, 
individuals who hunt would likely have higher tolerance levels. 
Consistent with the assumption that tolerance is driven in part by on-farm wildlife 
benefits, we expect landowners to be more tolerant of damage caused by wildlife species 
that provide more benefits. Thus producers would be more tolerant of  damage from 
geese and deer, two game species, than damage from raccoons and blackbirds, widely 
considered to be nuisance species. The data include crop yield losses by wildlife species 
and crop type-allowing  us to test for differences in tolerance thresholds by wildlife 
species. We accomplish this by organizing the data into a panel for which each obser- 
vation includes a unique crop type and wildlife species pair for each producer. Four crop 
types (corn,  wheat, silage andlor forage, and soybeans) are represented, with four species 
of  wildlife (raccoons, blackbirds, deer, and geese). Therefore, each producer could be 
represented by up to a total of  16 observations. In reality, the panel is much smaller, 
because most farmers did not report growing all four crops or damage from every species. 
An example of the panel structure is given in table 3. 
Table 4 provides a summary of variables included in the empirical model. The depend- 
ent variable is the binary response to the question of whether the level of damage that 
occurred was tolerable. The dollar value of damage is estimated as the market value of 
yield loss due to wildlife damage by crop and wildlife species for each producer. 
The Random Effects Model 
A random effects probit is used to account for farm-specific and wildlife species-specific 
effects. The dependent variable, Tolerable, is a binary variable indicating whether the 
individual farmer reported being willing to tolerate losses sustained in 1998. The data 
are arranged as an unbalanced panel in which relevant combinations of  crops and 
wildlife species are  given for each farm. The number of observations per farmer depends 
on the  number of crops grown, and number of species causing damage. The 241 different 
farms (of which 108  reported damage) are thus represented by 1,206 observations. The 
number of observations without damage is 906 and the number with damage is  300. The 
random effects probit is expressed as follows: 
where  is the unobserved hidden variable (tolerance threshold) specific to producer 
i for damage to crop c (c = 1,2,3,4)  from species s (s = 1,2,3,4)  (Greene, 2000). YCs  is 
a IK  x 1)  vector of exogenous variables; a and P are 11  x K}  vectors of variable coeffi- 
cients; and  is an error term that accounts for the variance across individuals. This 
error term is specific for each individual i and is constant across the {c  x a}  observations 
of each individual. The error term E,,  accounts for systematic variation across crop and 
wildlife species. While Y;  is not observable, we can observe the binary ("yes" or "no") 
variable Y,,,.  Both error terms are assumed to be normally distributed with a zero 
mean, and respective variance of  0;  and o:.  Let o2  = 0:  + o;,  p = o;/02, and impose the Rollins, Heigh, and Kanetkar  Net Cost of Wildlife Damage on Private Lands  527 
Table 3. Example of the Panel Data Structure 
Farm 
I.D. No. 
Damage  Willing to 
Species  Crop  ($9  Tolerate Damage 
1  Deer  Grain  124.50  Yes 
1  Raccoons  Corn  1,023.56  No 
2  Deer  Soybeans  859.36  No 
2  Geese  Corn  22.77  No 
3  Blackbirds  Soybeans  23.86  Yes 
3  Raccoons  Soybeans  950.00  Yes 
3  Raccoons  Corn  2,570.84  Yes 




Public Protected Area 
Private Protected Area 
% Farm Revenue 
% Crop Revenue 
Definition  Variable Type 
Response to question of whether damage  Dependentlbinary 
experienced was tolerable or not tolerable, by  variable 
species of wildlife and crop type 
Value of yield loss by crop type and wildlife  Continuous variable 
species type 
Number of acres specific to each crop type  Continuous variable 
Within 2 km proximity to public protected  1  = less than 2 km 
areas such as  parks  0 = farther than 2 km 
Within 2 km proximity to private protected  1  = less than 2 km 
areas  0 = farther than 2 km 
Percentage of household income from fanning  Continuous variable 
activities  between 1  and 100 
Percentage of farm income from field crops  Continuous variable 
between 1  and 100 
Crop Type:  Dummies for crop type, where 
Corn  Corn is the base 
Wheat 
Soybeans 






Dummies for wildlife species, where 
Raccoons is the base 
Perceived Population Change  Respondent's perception of change in wildlife  1  = increased 
population over past 5 years  0 = not increased 
Recreation Value  Respondent's rating of the importance of  1 = important 
wildlife for recreational purposes  0 = not important 
Insect Control Value  Respondent's rating of the importance of  1 = important 
wildlife for the control of insects or rodents  0 = not important 
Nonuse Value  Respondent's rating of the importance of  1  = important 
wildlife for education and aesthetics  0 = not important 
Past Prevention Effort  Preventative action taken to control damage at  1  = yes 
least once during prior five years  O=no 528  December 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
normalization that u2 = 1. Following Guilkey and Murphy (1983), the probability that 
Yks  = 1  is therefore defined as: 
where a(.)  is the normal cumulative distribution function, vi = %loi,  and p is the coeffi- 
cient representing the level of  correlation between the {c x  a}  responses of  a given 
individual. If p = 0, then correlation does not exist and a simple pooled probit model can 
be used for estimation. If p + 0, there are systematic components of  error that occur 
within groups. Failure to account for these errors results in biased standard errors of 
the coefficients. The test statistic for p is distributed x2  with one degree of freedom. 
Results 
The results of the random effects probit, summarized in table 5, reveal that the model is 
a significant predictor of the probability a farmer would be willing to tolerate a given level 
of wildlife damage.'  Crop type and wildlife species are dummy variables for which corn 
and raccoons, respectively, are  the bases. The log likelihood (- 132.49)  is significant at  1%. 
As expected, farmers are  least tolerant of damage by traditional nuisance species that 
provide for little in the way of wildlife use benefits. The parameter estimates for deer 
and geese are  positive and sigdicant,  indicating a higher tolerance threshold for damage 
caused by these game species, relative to that for raccoons. Damage from raccoons is 
least tolerated, while the coefficient for blackbird damage is not different from that for 
raccoon damage. Although landowners don't encourage blackbird or raccoon populations, 
willingness to tolerate damage from these species is consistent with the conjecture that 
landowners receive utility from the knowledge they contribute to habitat stewardship. 
The perception of the change in on-farm wildlife population size over time affects toler- 
ance. Farmers who perceive an increase in their on-farm wildlife populations are less 
likely to be tolerant of a given level of  damage. The positive Nonuse Value parameter 
estimate is consistent with the expectation that farmers who value wildlife for nonuse 
purposes have a higher tolerance threshold than those who do not hold these values. 
Parameters on crop type are not significant individually. This finding is not entirely 
surprising  since damage is the market value of the crop, and the parameter on damage 
is significant. This implies that the dollar loss in income captures the loss: crop type adds 
nothing to the model. The parameters for the percentages of household income from 
farming and farm income from field crops were significant with opposite signs. As the 
percentage of  damage for a given crop increases, the probability that the damage is 
tolerable declines. On the other hand, the probability that a given level of  damage is 
tolerable increases as the overall household income from farming increases. This latter 
result suggests that  producers for whom agriculture is a smaller contribution ofhousehold 
income are less tolerant of wildlife damage. Consequently, producers who are "part-time" 
farmers may be less invested with the stewardship role, while those who are "full-time" 
farmers are more invested with the stewardship role. However, all landowners are less 
likely to tolerate a given level of damage as it  represents larger proportions of a partic- 
ular crop by a particular wildlife species. 
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Table 5. Random Effects Probit Model Results:  Willingness  to  Tolerate Damage 
(N  = 1,206) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  z  p>  121 
ln(Damage)  -0.6909555  0.0991688  -6.967  0.000 
Crop Acreage  0.0025234  0.0008053  3.134  0.002 
Public Protected Area  -0.4880142  0.3689356  -1.323  0.186 
Private Protected Area  -0.1901989  0.3519856  -0.540  0.589 
% Farm Revenue  0.0133577  0.0056501  2.364  0.018 
% Crop Revenue  -0.0112881  0.0052049  -2.169  0.030 
Forage /Silagea  -0.0832003  0.3437428  -0.242  0.809 
Soybeans  0.2803119  0.3703238  0.757  0.449 
Wheat  0.0639850  0.4294650  0.149  0.882 
Blackbirds "  0.1350485  0.3677928  0.367  0.713 
Deer  0.9301151  0.2920575  3.185  0.001 
Geese  0.7745807  0.3749854  2.066  0.039 
Recreation Value  -0.6862118  0.3161651  -2.170  0.030 
Insect Control Value  0.0353223  0.4226714  0.084  0.933 
Nonuse Value  0.6642093  0.3452026  1.924  0.054 
Perceived Population Change  -0.6804137  0.3426990  -  1.985  0.047 
Past Prevention Effort  -0.6379280  0.2630459  -2.425  0.015 
Constant  3.7385070  0.8716673  4.289  0.000 
Log Likelihood  -  132.49248 
Rho  0.4223979  0.1184475 
"Crop type and wildlife species are dummy variables, where the respective base is Corn and Raccoons. 
The parameter estimates for the variables indicating proximity to protected areas 
containing wildlife habitat-Public  ProtectedArea and  Private Protected Area-are  both 
negative as expected. But it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis that these 
were not different from zero. 
The parameter for Recreation Value is significant at  the 1%  level, with a negative 
sign. This result is unexpected, since it implies farmers who value hunting have lower 
tolerance for damage. Upon further consideration, however, there is  a plausible explana- 
tion. Another part of the survey asked farmers to rank the  effectiveness of various forms 
of  prevention activities. The majority of  landowners ranked hunting as the most 
effective. However, many noted that barriers to the effective use of hunting pressure, 
such as no-shooting andlor no-trapping zones near municipal borders, the desirability 
of allowing unknown people with firearms on their land, limited availability of permits, 
and lack of wildlife management agency support,  limit the  use of hunting as an  effective 
damage prevention strategy. Based on focus group results, some Ontario farmers  believe 
that where wildlife damage is  problematic, effort to localize hunting pressure to reduce 
these populations should be considered as  part of a solution. Therefore, landowners who 
responded that on-farm wildlife populations are important for hunting values may also 
believe damage is indicative of wildlife populations which are "too high" and could be 
brought back to reasonable levels with increased hunting pressure. 
The negative sign on the value of damage suggests the probability of  tolerance 
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damage, the more likely the disutility from damage will exceed the  utility from benefits, 
as expected. Figure 3 illustrates the change in the probability of tolerance by the value 
of  damage to corn, by each species. 
The  Past Prevention Effort dummy variable is significant and negative, indicating 
farmers who had attempted to prevent damage at  least once during the previous five 
years have a lower tolerance threshold for wildlife damage. This result was expected, 
as  discussed above.' Figure 4 illustrates graphically the differences in tolerance thresh- 
olds between those who did and did not attempt to prevent damage to corn in the past 
for geese. Table 6 summarizes differences in median tolerance thresholds by species 
(discussed in fuller detail below). Median thresholds are generally less than half for 
those producers who had reported past attempts at prevention. 
These results reveal that for Ontario field crop producers, the following variables are 
significant predictors of tolerance: level of damage, species, perceived changes in local 
wildlife population sizes, past prevention effort (a  proxy for past damage),  nonuse values, 
recreation values, proportion of  income derived from farming, and acreage of  crop 
damaged. The type of wildlife species causing damage affected the tolerance threshold 
as expected, with damage by nuisance species being less tolerated than damage from 
more desirable species. 
Calculation of Tolerance Thresholds 
The probability that damage is tolerable is estimated over the range of damages in the 
sample according to equation (9): 
These results were used to derive the probability curves graphed in figures 3 and 4.'  Each 
parameter estimate from the tolerance function is multiplied by the corresponding 
average value for continuous variables, and 0 or 1  for dummy variables. Median values 
for tolerance thresholds (willingness to tolerate) are the dollar values of damage taken 
where the probability of a "yes" is equal to 50%. 
Average tolerance thresholds are calculated for crop type and wildlife species, and 
median values are presented in table 6. These tolerance thresholds are lowest for 
raccoons and blackbirds, and highest for geese and deer. As noted previously, proba- 
bilities of tolerance by damage level for each species are illustrated graphically for corn 
in figure 3, and figure 4 illustrates the effect of past damage on tolerance thresholds for 
geese damage. 
Net Utility Gains and Losses 
Where damage is below farmers' maximum willingness to tolerate damage, marginal 
increases in wildlife populations imply marginal net welfare gains. These marginal net 
A modified Wu-Hausman test found no evidence that the dummy variable for past prevention action introduced simul- 
taneity into the model due to its possible relationship with 1998  damages, a concern which was raised by a reviewer. 
The logit equation was used to estimate the probability curves using estimated probit coefficients according to Maddala 
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Value of Damage to Corn Yield 
Figure 3. Willingness to tolerate corn damage, by wildlife species 
CornIGeese  Prevention Effort 
Value of Corn Losses 
Figure 4. Willingness to tolerate corn losses from geese: 
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Table 6. Median Values of Willingness to Tolerate Damage, by Crop and 
Species ($) 
Wildlife Species 
Crop Type  Blackbirds  Deer  Raccoons  Geese 
Corn  586  1,851  482  1,478 
ForageISilage  420  1,641  427  1,310 
Soybeans  879  2,777  723  2,217 
Wheat  642  2,030  528  1,621 
Table 7. Yield Losses, and Net Costs and Benefits of  On-Farm Wildlife for 
Survey Sample ($) 
Only Respondents Reporting Damage  All Respondents 
[ll  [21  [31  [41  151  161 
Value of  Losers'  Gainers'  Net  Total  Total Net 
Crop Type  Yield Losses  Net Losses  Net Gains  Benefits  Gains  Benefits 
Corn  145,135  66,201  112,366  46,165  404,518  338,317 
ForageISilage  60,184  41,032  30,016  -  11,016  305,753  264,721 
Soybeans  28,677  4,352  70,644  66,297  412,659  408,307 
Wheat  4,198  0  37,795  37,795  270,991  270,991 
Totals:  238,194  111,585  250,821  139,241  1,393,921  1,282,336 
gains decrease to zero as wildlife populations increase to W,  due to marginal damage 
costs. Conversely, farmers with damages greater than their threshold would experience 
net marginal welfare losses with increases in wildlife. Using the damage tolerance 
thresholds derived above, both the net gains and net losses can be calculated for the 
sample. Table 7 summarizes these net marginal gains and losses. The first column 
indicates values of reported yield losses for each field crop. Column 2 is the net cost to 
only those respondents who reported damage in excess of  their tolerance thresholds 
(maximum willingness to pay for on-farm wildlife). The median tolerance threshold is 
subtracted from actual damage for each respondent to arrive at individual net loss. 
Individual net losses are summed to give losses for the sample. 
The third column indicates the  net gain to those who reported damage at  levels below 
the calculated tolerance thresholds. Column 4, net benefits, is the difference between 
the previous two. Except for foragelsilage, on-farm wildlife is a net marginal gain, in 
aggregate, for those with damage. We interpret these results to be consistent with 
anecdotal reports from focus groups. Specifically, damage from wildlife is not a wide- 
spread problem for most farmers; the hardship is generated by the uneven distribution 
of costs. 
Columns 5 and 6 of table 7 extrapolate these results over all respondents to include 
those who reported no damage. Total gains are the total benefits to landowners from 
on-farm wildlife for the sample. Total net benefits (column 6) are  the difference between 
total gains (column 5) and total losses (column 2). Benefits for those with no damage are 
assumed to be the estimated values of the tolerance thresholds. Thus, over the entire 
sample, the net benefit from on-farm wildlife is $1,282,336, or almost 10  times as great 
as the value of the yield losses. Rollins, Heigh, and Kanetkar  Net Cost of Wildlife Damage on Private Lands  533 
Table 8. Tolerance Thresholds for Damage to Corn and Decisions 
to Undertake Prevention Effort over the Previous Five Years ($1 
No Prevention Effort During  Prevention Effort During 





Table 8 shows the differences in willingness to tolerate corn damage from each wild- 
life species, broken down by whether or not farmers undertook past prevention activities 
during the previous five years. In each case, the tolerance thresholds for those who had 
tried to prevent damage in the past five years was less than half of those who did not, 
as hypothesized. For example, the median tolerance threshold damage from geese is 
about $1,000 per year lower for farmers who attempted to prevent damage previously 
than for those who did not. (Figure 4 illustrates  these differences graphically for geese.) 
Implications 
This study demonstrates that farmers' tolerance thresholds, as defined in the wildlife 
management literature, can be interpreted as  their maximum net marginal willingness 
to pay for on-farm wildlife. Tolerance thresholds can be measured empirically and used 
to approximate the net welfare impacts of on-farm wildlife populations. The marginal 
net welfare effect of on-farm wildlife can be positive or negative, depending on the size 
of  the population, marginal damage costs, and net marginal utility generated by the 
wildlife for the landowner. Because they are derived from preferences and marginal 
damage costs, tolerance thresholds vary with landowner and farm characteristics. 
As indicated by data from Ontario, overall, the net welfare impact from the four wild- 
life species on field crop producers in the sample was positive, due to on-farm utility 
gains that  outweigh damage costs in aggregate. When focusing exclusively on those who 
bear damage in excess of  their gains, however, the net welfare loss ($111,585) is less 
than half of the financial value of the yield losses ($238,194).  The results obtained from 
this approach using the Ontario data suggest that the economic problem for these field 
crop producers is  not simply the financial cost of damage, which may be inevitable given 
the presence of on-farm wildlife. Rather, the economic problem is how the net costs of 
damage are distributed. A small number of producers appear to sustain a large propor- 
tion of damages, while the utility gains from on-farm wildlife are distributed widely over 
all producers and nonproducers. Indeed, the overall net impact over the sample is a 
dollar-valued utility gain of more than 10 times the damage costs. These results 
emphasize that focusing solely on the financial value of crop losses from wildlife may 
lead to an incomplete evaluation of the marginal welfare effects of on-farm wildlife on 
landowners. 
This research demonstrates that not all crop yield loss resulting from on-farm wildlife 
activity should be interpreted as indicative of a net economic loss to farmers. This finding 
is consistent with opinions voiced in focus groups conducted as part of  the study, in 
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affirm they take into account wildlife needs in assessing the productivity of their lands. 
Many assert, however that they object to localized wildlife populations  which are 
allowed to increase to levels where damage sustained is in excess of what they believe 
to be reasonable. This implies that landowners believe they are able to assess what 
"reasonable" on-farm wildlife populations should look like, and what constitutes "reason- 
able" levels of  wildlife damage due to forage and habitat needs on their farmland. A 
-  "reasonable" level of damage is, nevertheless, as perceived by the individual and esti- 
mable as indicated in this study. 
Given these results, it is safe to conclude that wildlife damage policies in general 
which are based on the value of yield loss are likely to overstate economic damage, and 
thus lead to suboptimal wildlife management and damage policy. Full compensation for 
yield losses, for example, would overvalue the net value of on-farm wildlife damage and 
undervalue  wildlife. Many focus group participants for this study expressed concern that 
compensation for yield loss would leave the  public with the perception that  farmers  were 
not supportive of wildlife and habitatwhen  in reality their objection was with wildlife 
populations which were "too large." 
To address distributional issues, an appropriate policy may target areas for wildlife 
removal/dispersal effort where farmers report on-farm damages over their tolerance 
thresholds, and where excessive damage has already occurred, to redistribute wildlife 
benefits. Programs that provide special wildlife hunting permits to reduce local problem 
wildlife populations are examples of this approach. Another policy option is to identify 
ways to increase tolerance thresholds, where damages are not severe. The approach 
developed in this study can be used to determine the impacts of factors such as prox- 
imity to protected areas, wildlife species, and farm characteristics on landowner 
tolerance thresholds, thereby allowing wildlife managers to better predict when and 
where problems may arise. 
[Received April 2002;Jinal revision received September 2004.1 
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Appendix: 
Example of the Survey Question Format 
Used to Elicit the Dependent Variable 
The survey was organized into sections that pertained to individual  wildlife species. Participants were 
asked about both positive and negative aspects of  wildlife presence. They were asked to estimate the 
percentage of  yield loss, by crop type, at time of  harvest that they believed was attributable to the 
wildlife species in question. They were not asked to apply a dollar value to this loss. Rather, the 
researchers used the respondents' total acreage, along with county data for expected crop yields, to 
convert the percentage loss to crop units. The number of  units lost was then multiplied by the market 
price for that crop type. Thus, for the empirical model, the damage estimate was in dollar units, while 
the sample question below was posed in terms of the percentage yield losses by species and crop type. 
For the survey section that dealt with Canada geese presence on private lands, the tolerance question 
read as follows: 
How would you rate the losses by geese to your field crops in 1998? 
Tolerable  Not Tolerable 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Wheat 
Grain Silage 
Forages 